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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(k) (1996) and Rule 42 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee is Plaintiff Anthony Kraatz, 
referred to as "Kraatz." Appellees and Cross-Appellants are 
Defendants Oral Bryan Wilkinson ("B. Wilkinson"), Jeffrey J. 
Wilkinson ("J. Wilkinson") and Heritage Imports, a Utah corpora-
tion, dba Heritage Honda ("Heritage"). Defendants are sometimes 
collectively referred to as "Heritage." 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Heritage has reviewed the numerous issues on appeal raised 
by Kraatz, and believes the real issues are thus:1 
1. Issue: Whether this appeal should even be considered, 
as Kraatz has failed to marshal the evidence. 
Standard of Review: This Court has stated in 
Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1990): 
1
 Kraatz's Brief, which lists six issues for appeal, and 
thirty-one separate headings in his Table of Contents under 
"Argument," calls to mind the following: "If you cannot win 
reversal with your six best points, then the 20th or 30th will 
probably be unsuccessful, too." Spears, Presenting an Effective 
Appeal, 21 Trial 95(6) (November 1985). See also Baskin, Wasted 
Words or Persuasive Prose: Connecting with the Appellate Court, 
58 Fla. B. J. 69-72 (1985) (A scatter-gun weakens an argument). 
1 
Our standard for overturning factual findings is a 
rigorous one—we may not set aside such findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Sweeney Land Co. v. 
Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). To establish clear error, lf[a]n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' ...." In 
re Bartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This 
burden "is a heavy one, reflective of the fact that we 
do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts." 
Id. at 886. Accordingly, when an appellant fails to 
carry its burden of marshaling the evidence, "we refuse 
to consider the merits of challenges to the findings 
and accept the findings as valid." Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) . 
We are thus obliged to consider the findings from 
the standpoint of the supporting evidence and not from 
"appellant's view of the way he or she believes the 
facts should have been found." Ashton v. Ashton, 73 3 
P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in its interpreta-
tion of the contract.2 
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of 
law and fact. "In interpreting a contract, "the intentions of 
the parties are controlling." Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 
104, 108 (Utah 1991). Questions of intent from extrinsic evi-
dence are questions of fact and are not set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. See Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 
2
 Appellant has characterized this as three issues with 
subparts. See Kraatz Brief "Statement of Issues," No. 2 (whether 
the trial court erred in its interpretation of refusal), and 
Nos. 4 and 5 (whether the court erred in finding the Agreement 
was integrated). In his Brief, these issues are addressed in the 
nine points under Point II. See Kraatz Brief, Table of Contents, 
pp. i-ii. 
2 
1990). "When an appellant is essentially challenging the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence, a clearly erroneous standard of 
appellate review applies." American Vending Services. Inc. v. 
Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The question of 
substantial performance is a question of fact. Saunders v. 
Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Findings of fact 
of the trial court "shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a); see also Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 
760, 761 (Utah 1990) ; Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appl. 
and Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88, 93 (Utah 1988); Western Kane County 
Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 
1377 (Utah 1987). 
CROSS-APPEAL 
Heritage has filed a cross-appeal. Its sole issue is as 
follows: 
Issue. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendants' 
Motion to Amend their Answer and File a Counterclaim to recover 
attorney's fees pursuant to the express provisions of the Employ-
ment Agreement between Defendant Heritage Honda and Plaintiff 
William Anthony Kraatz ("Agreement"). 
Standard of Review: A motion to amend a pleading 
is within the trial court's sound discretion. See Pasker. Gould, 
Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah Ct. App. 
3 
1994). Therefore, a ruling denying a motion for leave to amend 
will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. 
Andalex Resources. Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) . However, leave to amend shall be freely given. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Also, the trial court "shall award 
reasonable fees in accordance with the terms of the parties1 
agreement." Saunders v. Sharp. 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(Nature and Course of Proceeding, Disposition at Trial) 
Kraatz's appeal is from the trial court's oral and written 
Findings of Fact ("FF") and Conclusions of Law ("CL") following a 
four-day bench trial, entered on Friday, September 20, 1996, and 
from its Judgment dated October 28, 1996, dismissing Kraatz's 
Complaint for no cause of action. 
The cross-appeal of Heritage is from a Minute Entry, dated 
July 30, 1996, and subsequent formal Order dated August 29, 1996, 
of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, entered before and during a four-day bench trial before the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick denying their request for leave to 
amend their answer and to assert a counterclaim. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kraatz objects to relatively few of the court's findings— 
certainly not enough to determine the outcome. In order to 
demonstrate how few of the findings of fact Kraatz opposes (which 
number over 100), Heritage has attached as Addendum "C" a copy of 
the court's written findings, and as Addendum "D" a copy of the 
trial court's oral findings, and in each has highlighted those 
findings to which Kraatz objects.3 
A review of these facts is essential, not only to demon-
strate the sheer number Kraatz did not challenge, but because 
they demonstrate 1) that Kraatz failed to marshal the evidence, 
and 2) that the trial court's findings are supported and are not 
clearly erroneous. Rather than recounting each fact, Heritage 
has chosen the following examples of the facts Kraatz has not 
challenged to demonstrate these points: 
1. Heritage is a Utah corporation which for years operated 
an automobile dealership in Murray, Utah. It was essentially a 
family-owned automobile dealership in which B. Wilkinson was the 
owner and majority shareholder and his four children, including 
his son J. Wilkinson, were minority shareholders and officers and 
directors of the corporation. At least three of his four chil-
dren and his son-in-law worked for the dealership. (R. 2467, FF 
Nos. A.1-3 (R. 1683-84).) 
3
 Other than the addition of highlighting, the only other 
change has been to replace the citations with the appropriate 
citation to the record. 
5 
2. Kraatz was a good friend of B. Wilkinson. He had 
several discussions with B. Wilkinson about the performance of 
the dealership, and was aware Heritage was not doing as well as 
B. Wilkinson wanted. Kraatz was dissatisfied with his job in 
St. George and was looking for a lucrative management position, 
even if it meant moving to Salt Lake City and managing a dealer-
ship in which the owner's children were stockholders, directors, 
and management personnel of the corporation. (R. 2467-68; FF 
Nos. B.l-3.) 
3. The principal thrust of the negotiations was that the 
dealership must return to profitability. (R. 2467, FF Nos. B.l-3 
(R. 1685).) 
4. Kraatz told B. Wilkinson Heritage should make 
$1 million a year with Kraatz as general manager. Kraatz also 
told him he could raise the gross margin per car if he were 
general manager. (FF Nos. B.5-6 (R. 1686).) 
5. The parties agreed B. Wilkinson's children were to be 
trained in management duties to ultimately assume control, and 
Kraatz would be the day-to-day manager of Heritage and allow B. 
Wilkinson to semi-retire, in exchange for which Kraatz was to 
receive considerable remuneration. (R. 2467, FF No. B.5 
(R. 1686).) 
6. Kraatz had full access to the financial information of 
the dealership, and was aware of B. Wilkinson's spending habits 
before he ever signed the Agreement. During his tenure as 
general manager he continued to have full access, and had several 
6 
"accountability" meetings with Wilkinson and the comptroller in 
which his failure to make a profit was discussed. (FF No. B.4, 7 
(R. 1685-86); FFNo. E.24 (R. 1695).) 
7. All of Kraatz's duties set forth in Section 1.2 from his 
Draft Agreement (Exhibit 589), were incorporated into the Employ-
ment Agreement (Exhibit 38). A new subparagraph c. was added to 
paragraph 2.1 of the Draft Agreement, providing termination for 
"Refusal by Employee to fulfill his employment responsibilities 
described in Article I of this Agreement." (FF No. B.10 (R. 
1686); Exhibits 38 and 589.)4 
8. Kraatz1s duties also included responsibility for produc-
ing income for Heritage, the care and keeping of its assets, 
financial forecasting and budgeting, the hiring and firing of 
employees, advertising decisions, and management of cash flow. 
(FF Nos. D.l-5, 10 (R. 1688-90).) 
9. Kraatz1s conduct while in control created dissention 
with B. Wilkinson's children. Kraatz demoted J. Wilkinson twice 
and threatened him with termination. During the entire time he 
was general manager, Kraatz never trained J. Wilkinson by placing 
him in the parts department, service department or in accounting. 
At no time did Kraatz instruct J. Wilkinson on such general 
4
 Kraatz makes a material omission in his statement of facts 
when he claims, "The Agreement [was] prepared by Heritage's 
counsel ...." This is not accurate because it ignores the fact 
that the initial agreement, Exhibit 589, was drafted by counsel 
for Kraatz. There are differences in these two agreements which 
the trial court found material in determining the intent of the 
parties. See CL B.10 (R. 1710); FF Nos. B.ll, 12 (R. 1687). A 
copy of Exhibit 589, the Draft Agreement, is attached as Addendum 
"B." 
7 
management skills and duties as the hiring and firing of person-
nel, management of assets, or employee interviews. (FF No. E.5 
(R. 1689).) 
10. Heritage had in place with Comerica Bank a $3 million 
flooring line which was cross-collateralized and cross-defaulted 
with a mortgage loan. In December of 1990 Dan Hartmann, Vice 
President of Comerica Bank in charge of flooring for Heritage, 
was notified that Heritage was changing its flooring from 
Comerica to Key Bank. The decision to move the flooring caused 
Heritage to become in default, requiring it to pay penalties in 
the approximate amount of $114,000. (FF Nos. E.19-13 (R. 1692-
93).) 
11. Both Kraatz and B. Wilkinson told Hartmann that Kraatz 
had complete control and responsibility of Heritage. Hartmann 
dealt exclusively with Kraatz from the time he was introduced to 
him until January 11, 1991, after Comerica had been notified that 
Heritage was moving the flooring. (FF Nos. D.8-9 (R. 1689-90), 
R. 2059; FF No. D.10 (R. 1689) R. 2052-53, 2059.) 
12. Saturday is the highest volume sales day in the car 
business, and the best sales time of each day is from 4:00 p.m. 
until closing. (FF Nos. D.13, E.15 (R. 1690, 1693).) 
13. Kraatz1s own expert witness, Mark D. Schmitz, charac-
terized a Honda franchise as a "license to steal." (FF No. B.8 
(R. 1686) R. 2339.)5 
5
 He also stated that it was a better investment than a 
mutual fund. (R. 2339.) 
8 
14. Larry H. Miller persuasively testified that his exami-
nation of the financial statements indicated Heritage was not 
undercapitalized and that it should have made a profit in 1992. 
Miller testified his Toyota dealership, of a similar size, loca-
tion, and with an equally popular import, was less capitalized 
than Heritage, yet made a profit for the years 1990, 1991, and 
1992. (FF Nos. E.2-4, E.22 (R. 1690-91, 1695).) 
15. Kraatz was employed with Heritage from May, 1990 
through November 11, 1992. In 1990 Heritage lost $295,515, in 
1991, it realized a profit of only $5,169, and in 1992 it lost 
$124,980. (FF No. E.l (R. 1690).) 
16. Kraatz never saw a copy of the Employee Handbook 
("Handbook") before signing the Agreement, did not have an 
acknowledgement that he had received a Handbook, and made the 
decision, after attending a seminar on employment, to have the 
employees turn in the Handbooks. (CL No. C.l-3 (R. 1711-12); FF 
Nos. F.l-6 (R. 1696-97).) 
17. The evidence was hotly contested, leaving the trial 
court to assess the credibility of the witnesses1 testimony in 
determining the more credible and persuasive evidence. 
(R. 2466.) 
9 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Kraatz has filed an appeal from a four-day bench trial in 
which the trial court ruled Kraatz's termination was justified 
under the Agreement between Kraatz and Heritage,6 
Kraatz's appeal is procedurally defective and is lacking in 
merit. Procedurally, Kraatz's appeal is defective and should not 
be considered because he has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings, as the law requires him to 
do. The trial court's findings should thus be accepted as valid 
and its ruling affirmed on this basis alone. 
Kraatz's Brief is also procedurally defective because he 
continually urges the wrong standard of review. He continually 
characterizes issues as questions of law when they are clearly 
issues of fact, or mixed issues of fact and law in which the 
legal issues go to the heart of the factual findings. 
In addition to these material procedural defects, Kraatz's 
appeal must be denied as there is no substantive merit to his 
appeal. The trial court made over one hundred detailed findings 
of fact and over fifty detailed conclusions of law, many of which 
were based on other detailed findings of fact. The trial court's 
ruling is well grounded in factual and legal support. There is 
6
 A copy of the complete Agreement is attached as Exhibit 
"A" in Addendum of Heritage. All citations to the record and to 
exhibits which are not included in the Appendices of Kraatz are 
included in the Addendum of Heritage as Exhibit "E." To avoid 
duplication, all other references may be found in Kraatz Appendi-
ces. 
10 
no basis for the ruling to be disturbed. The trial court's 
ruling as to Kraatz should thus be affirmed. 
As to the cross-appeal by Heritage, the trial court's ruling 
should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for 
a determination of a reasonable attorney's fee in favor of 
Heritage. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
Heritage's motion to amend its answer, based on its erroneous 
assumption that further discovery was necessary, and thus preju-
dice to Kraatz would result in the amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
KRAATZ HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
Kraatz has the heavy burden of marshaling all of the evi-
dence supporting the decision of the trial court, and he must 
demonstrate those findings to be "so lacking in support as to be 
xagainst the clear weight of the evidence.111 Saunders v. Sharp, 
793 P.2d at 931 (citations omitted).7 
This Court has repeatedly held that to 
successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's posi-
tion. In order to properly discharge the [marshaling] 
7
 See also Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) "[I]n order to challenge a trial court's findings of 
fact on appeal, the challenger must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings in question. We will uphold 
the trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to appropri-
ately marshal all of the evidence." (Citations omitted.) 
11 
duty ..., the challenger must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists." 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 
1051, 1052-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). But the duty does not end 
here: 
Once appellants have established every pillar support-
ing their adversary's position, they then "must ferret 
out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those 
pillars fail to support the trial court's findings. 
Id. If a party fails to appropriately marshal the evidence, the 
trial court's findings are upheld. See Macris & Assocs. v. 
Images & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). See 
also CellCom v. Systems Communication Corp.. 939 P.2d 185, 189-90 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Kraatz has failed meet his burden of marshaling the evi-
dence. In Marshall v. Marshall, the appellate court found the 
defendant had not properly marshaled the evidence because he 
"merely recited the findings on point and then highlighted the 
evidence which he deemed contrary to the findings." Marshall v. 
Marshallr 915 P.2d at 516. The appellate court thus refused to 
disturb the trial court's findings. See id. 
As in Marshall, Kraatz has not marshaled the evidence; he 
merely recites findings on point, and then spends pages arguing 
for evidence he deems contrary to those findings. Although 
supposedly Kraatz has only raised six issues on appeal, his third 
point, challenging the court's factual findings, actually has 
twenty-five different sections—eleven subheadings, and fourteen 
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sub-sub headings. Heritage need not address every one of these 
challenged by Kraatz to demonstrate his failure to marshal. It 
is not the duty of Heritage to marshal the evidence. Below, 
however, are significant findings of the trial court which Kraatz 
seeks to challenge to which he has not marshaled the evidence. 
Having demonstrated Kraatz's failure to marshal all the evidence 
as to these significant findings, this Court need go no further; 
the trial court's rulings should be affirmed. 
A. Control. 
An example of Kraatz's failure to marshal the evidence is on 
his challenge to the finding that he had control over the financ-
es of Heritage. This is a significant finding because he said he 
should make $1 million a year for Heritage as general manager, 
and yet Heritage was not profitable under his management. 
Kraatz1s attempts to challenge written findings B.13 and E.l are 
insufficient. He lists the following evidence as supporting the 
trial court's findings regarding his control: 
1) Kraatz and Wilkinson both told Hartmann, of 
Comerica, that Kraatz was in control of Heritage; 
2) Hartmann testified he dealt only with Kraatz 
until after January 11, 1991, by which time the deci-
sion to move the flooring had been made (R. 2046-48); 
3) As a general manager Kraatz was to make adver-
tising decisions (R. 1851); 
4) Miller testified a general manager managed 
cash flow and that Kraatz did not manage it well (R. 
2081); 
5) One of the reasons for the parties' entering 
into the Agreement was for Kraatz to manage Heritage 
and thus allow B. Wilkinson to semi-retire (R. 2467) ; 
and 
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6) The language of the Agreement gave Kraatz 
control. See Exhibit 38. 
Kraatz Brief at 50-51. 
Kraatz states he has "scoured the record," and the above—as 
if it were not enough—"is all the evidence adduced at trial to 
support Finding B13 or Conclusion El." Kraatz Brief at 51, 52. 
In fact, Kraatz did not marshal all the evidence. Missing 
from his facts (especially in light of the facts he claims 
require a setting aside of the trial court's findings) are 
further facts which were readily available to him in the court's 
written and oral findings; a "scouring" of the record would un-
doubtedly produce further support for the trial court's ruling. 
Examples of some of these additional facts are as follows: 
1) Larry Miller testified that, in spite of B. 
Wilkinson's "significant" spending, Heritage was not 
undercapitalized and that Kraatz should have made a 
profit (R. 2222, 2078, 2085); 
2) Kraatz asked B. Wilkinson to help him with 
advertising (R. 1932, 2261); 
3) Kraatz had monthly accountability meetings at 
which the lack of profitability of Heritage was dis-
cussed (R. 2469); 
4) Kraatz told Hartmann that he, Kraatz, had the 
power to fire B. Wilkinson's children (R. 2059) ; 
5) Kraatz demoted J. Wilkinson twice and threat-
ened to fire him (R. 2469); 
6) Kraatz made and carried out the decision to 
turn in Employee Handbooks (Exhibit 23, R. 1846-47); 
and 
7) Kraatz admitted it was his responsibility to 
produce income, maintain the assets for Heritage and to 
budget and forecast (R. 1851) . 
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These findings demonstrate Kraatz did not marshal the 
evidence. These are facts Kraatz should have included because 
they support the trial court's finding. Kraatz then had the duty 
to demonstrate the findings of fact "are so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence." Again, Kraatz 
does not do this, but simply tries to reargue what he argued at 
trial. This is not marshaling. 
B. Kraatz's Refusal to Work Saturdays. 
Kraatz seeks to challenge the trial court's oral and written 
findings that he refused to work Saturdays. (R. 2469; FF Nos. 
E.21(d), E.15.) See Kraatz Brief pp. 37-44. Kraatz challenges 
this finding in spite of the fact that even under his version of 
"refusal"8 there is sufficient support for the trial court's 
ruling Kraatz's termination was justified. 
Kraatz does not marshal the evidence. His only attempt at 
doing so is not to list the actual facts which support the 
court's finding but simply to state the pages of transcript 
containing relevant testimony, the identity of exhibits and the 
schedule Kraatz refused to work.9 
8
 See Point III, supra. 
9
 E.g., "written Findings E15 and E21(d) ... are supported, 
by the eight pages of testimony Kraatz cites from B. Wilkinson 
(R. 2006, 2035-37, 1937-40), nine pages of testimony from J. 
Wilkinson (R. 2058-62), and the work schedule prepared by J. 
Wilkinson (Kraatz Brief Exhibit 1), ostensibly pursuant to the 
authority given him by his father." Kraatz Brief at 37-38. 
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This is not marshaling. Kraatz does not list (nor does he 
challenge) the following facts which he should have marshaled, as 
they support the trial court's findings: 
1) Saturdays are the biggest sales days in the 
car business and from 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon until 
closing is the best sales time of each day (R. 2006) ; 
2) B. Wilkinson asked Kraatz to work Saturdays 
because he believed the general manager needed to be 
visible at the store at these crucial times (R. 2036); 
3) B. Wilkinson had directed J. Wilkinson to 
prepare a schedule requiring Kraatz to work Saturdays 
(R. 2768) ; and 
4) Kraatz did not work the schedule (R. 23 64-65). 
Kraatz did not cite or make any reference to Exhibit 2, the 
schedule Kraatz made after refusing to work the schedule prepared 
at B. Wilkinson's direction. See Exhibit 2, Appendices. This 
schedule is important because it demonstrates that Kraatz, even 
after being presented with a schedule demonstrating he was to 
work Saturdays, still refused to schedule himself for Saturdays. 
Nor does Kraatz point out that B. Wilkinson was the owner 
and CEO of Heritage, and that J. Wilkinson was an officer and 
director of Heritage as well as an employee subordinate to 
Kraatz. Nor does he cite the testimony of J. Wilkinson that he 
frequently made schedules. (R. 2364.) This is important for it 
supports the court's finding that J. Wilkinson had the authority 
to schedule Kraatz to work Saturdays at his father's direction. 
Nor when challenging the Wilkinsons' authority to prepare a work 
schedule does Kraatz point out that B. Wilkinson was the owner 
and J. Wilkinson an officer and director of Heritage in his own 
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right. These are just a few examples of significant facts which 
Kraatz should have marshaled in support of the trial court's 
findings. 
Kraatz also fails the second prong of his marshaling duty— 
that of showing that the findings are clearly erroneous. Once he 
has scoured the record for all evidence in support of the trial 
court's finding, he is to demonstrate that the findings "are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence." CellCom v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 
185, 189 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Kraatz does not do this. In-
stead, he simply attempts to reargue the evidence he believes 
supports his position. For example, it is uncontroverted that 
Kraatz did not work the schedule given him by J. Wilkinson, and 
that he did not schedule himself to work any Saturday in the 
schedule he subsequently prepared for the same time period. 
(Exhibits 1 and 2.) Kraatz spends pages of his brief arguing 
that Kraatz did not "refuse" but that it "would be difficult for 
him" to work Saturdays. Kraatz Brief at 40. This is simply 
arguing with the findings; even if what Kraatz said was true, it 
does not rise to the level of showing the finding to be "so 
lacking in support as against the clear weight of the evidence." 
Id. 
C. Training. 
Kraatz also failed to marshal the evidence in his challenge 
to the court's oral and written findings (R. 2469, FF Nos. E.6, 
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E.16 and E.21(h)) that he did not train B. Wilkinson's children, 
as required by the Agreement. Kraatz Brief pp. 44-50. 
Again, rather than marshaling all the evidence, Kraatz lists 
some of the evidence in support of the findings only to then 
spend most of his brief arguing his version of the facts. 
For example, Kraatz admits in his brief that the following 
facts support the trial court's finding: 
1. Kraatz was required to train the children under the 
Agreement; 
2. J. Wilkinson testified he did not receive any training 
in significant areas in the dealership—accounting, parts, 
service, and the interviewing, hiring and firing of employees (R. 
2380-81); 
3. B. Wilkinson testified that Kraatz did not train his 
children—Kraatz just did not get the job done, and that training 
"just did not happen" (R. 2041). 
Kraatz Brief at 44. Given these facts, all Kraatz's parsing 
of language—about "training" meaning "training relative to 
American Honda," and "to be in F&I" meaning "while in F&I," 
etc.—is immaterial. 
D. Medical Reimbursement. 
Kraatz does not even attempt to marshal evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings that he was not entitled to reim-
bursable medical expenses or any damages relating to the value of 
the dealership. See Kraatz Brief Point IV, at 61-62. It is 
ironic that of the millions of dollars in alleged damages Kraatz 
18 
claimed in his Complaint that he now focuses on a claim for 
approximately $8,000 and for the value of stock had the court 
found in his favor. In doing so, Kraatz ignores the fact that 
the court specifically found he breached the Agreement and was 
terminated for cause.10 
E. Profitability. 
Perhaps most important is Kraatz's failure to properly 
marshal the evidence in challenging the trial court's findings 
concerning profitability. Kraatz Brief at 57-59. Kraatz admits 
that the financial statements demonstrate Heritage lost $295,515 
in 1990, realized a profit of only $5,169 in 1991, and lost 
$124,980 in 1992. See Exhibits 295, 296, and 297. 
But he fails to marshal other evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings. This evidence includes: 
1. Kraatz's own expert, Mark Schmitz, said a Honda dealer-
ship is a "license to steal," and a better investment than a 
mutual fund (R. 2339) ; 
2. Larry H. Miller testified Heritage had enough capital 
and its lack of profitability was due to Kraatz's failure to 
manage cash flow (R. 2081-82, 2095); 
3. Kraatz admitted it was his responsibility to produce 
income and to maintain the assets for Heritage (R. 1851); 
10
 In Utah, it is well settled that in order to recover on a 
contract, one must first establish his own performance or a valid 
excuse for his failure to perform. See Nielsen v. Chin-Hsiena 
Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980). 
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4. Dan Hartmann testified he dealt exclusively with Kraatz 
during the time the decision was made to move the flooring from 
Key Bank, a decision which cost Heritage approximately $114,000 
in penalties and interest (R. 2052-53, 2059); and 
5. Kraatz admitted he was responsible for relationships 
with the banks (R. 1808-11); see also Kraatz Brief at 39, 
Ironically it is the issue of profitability on which Kraatz 
makes his only real attempt to meet his burden of marshaling— 
that of demonstrating the court's finding is so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. But 
in doing so, he mischaracterizes the evidence. 
Kraatz claims the finding that 1992 was not profitable is 
immaterial, because the financial statements for August and 
September of 1992 show a profit. This is incorrect. While the 
profit line on these statements may technically show a profit, 
the amount in the "prepaids" portion of the financial statement 
for these months demonstrates that the company is not profitable. 
This is clear in viewing the thirteenth statement for 1992. See 
Exhibit No. 297. 
Kraatz had a duty to marshal this evidence for the court in 
his brief. He also had a duty to marshal the testimony of his 
own expert, Mark Schmitz. Schmitz testified that the profit 
lines on the August and September financial statements on which 
Kraatz relies do not reflect the actual profit because several 
expenses, such as advertising, had been deferred until the end of 
the year, and it was not until December that they were placed in 
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the correct accounts. (R. 2313-14.) These expenses, if moved 
from prepaid to the correct accounts, would also show a signifi-
cant loss as of August and September 1992. (R. 2313-14; Exhibit 
295.) 
F. Other Examples of Failure to Marshal. 
Kraatz also failed to marshall any evidence supporting the 
trial court's finding regarding customer complaints. Rather than 
marshal the evidence as to customer complaints, Kraatz simply 
states the finding is "insufficient" because no specific examples 
were given. Kraatz Brief at 53-54. 
As to the court's finding that the morale of Heritage was 
low while Kraatz was general manager, Kraatz does not challenge 
the testimony of Pat Nichols, who said the morale of Heritage was 
low; he simply states it was not the fault of Kraatz but that of 
B. Wilkinson's children. Kraatz Brief at 56-57. Had Kraatz 
marshaled the evidence, he would have cited the following facts 
in support of the trial court's findings: 
1. Kraatz knew, before ever signing the Agreement, that 
Heritage "was essentially a family-run business with Bry Wilkin-
son functioning as the owner and at least three of his four 
children and son-in-law working for the corporation" (R. 2467); 
2. Kraatz's duty was to train the children in management 
duties so that they could ultimately assume control (R. 2467) ; 
3. "Kraatz was dissatisfied and was looking for a lucrative 
management position..., even if it entailed moving into a general 
manager position of authority over children of the owner who were 
21 
stockholders, directors and management personnel in their own 
right of the corporation" (R. 2468); 
4. Kraatz demoted J. Wilkinson twice (R. 2468); 
5. He threatened J. Wilkinson with termination (R. 2468); 
and 
6. He created severe resistance to his control (R. 2468). 
All of these facts demonstrate that Kraatz did not marshal the 
evidence, A similar exercise as to each other fact he challenges 
would no doubt demonstrate the same.11 
All of these facts demonstrate Kraatz did not marshal the 
evidence. A similar exercise as to each of the remaining twenty-
one facts he challenges would likely demonstrate the same.12 
11
 See, e.g., Kraatz's challenge to the finding that Kraatz 
manipulated or modified the balance sheet. Support not mentioned 
is in lines 23-25 on p. 1 and p. 4 of the 1990 financial state-
ment (Exhibit 295); lines 23-24 on p. 1 and line 24 on p. 4 for 
1991 (Exhibit 296); and lines 23 and 24 on p. 1 and line 20 on p. 
4 for 1992 (Exhibit 297). 
12
 See, for example, his challenge to the court's finding 
that he manipulated the balance sheets. He does not cite to the 
balance sheets himself to support this, but argues on at least 
three different occasions that B. Wilkinson said Tony was an 
honest man. Kraatz Brief at 32, 34, 62. Testimony actually 
states as follows: 
Q. You don't believe Tony was dishonest in any way in 
connection with the Snider transaction we just 
talked about do you? 
A. I think I said in my deposition that I don't think 
Tony's basically a dishonest person. 
(R. 1977-78, Wilkinson vol. 3, p. 3021 1. 10.) 
Wilkinson is not testifying affirmatively to Tony's honesty, nor 
is he denying that Tony was dishonest in relation to the Snider 
transaction. 
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Because of this, this Court should not consider his challenges, 
and the trial court's findings should be accepted as valid. 
POINT II 
KRAATZ SETS FORTH THE WRONG STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Kraatz continually sets forth the wrong standard of review 
as to the issues in his brief. Kraatz claims that five of the 
six issues he sets forth are questions of law, when in fact they 
are all either strictly issues of fact, or are mixed issues of 
fact and law. 
For example, Kraatz claims his first issue is an issue of 
law. This is either a misunderstanding by Kraatz of the relevant 
law, or a misstatement of the trial court's ruling. Kraatz's 
first issue is as follows: 
Whether the trial court erred by ruling that even when 
a contract of employment for a definite term is estab-
lished an employer has no burden to show justification 
for discharge. 
The cases on which Kraatz relies which discuss employment 
for a definite term all concern cases in which there was no 
written agreement, but rather an employee seeking to establish an 
implied agreement based on the terms of the employee handbook. 
The establishment of employment of a definite term is not a 
contract provision, but simply the first step in overcoming the 
at-will presumption. See Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 
P.2d 1033, 1045 (Utah 1989). In addition, an implied-in-fact 
promise cannot contradict a written contract term. Jd. at 1044. 
In this case, there is a written contract, and the trial court 
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found that Kraatz's termination under the contract was justi-
fied.13 (CL No. 1 at R. 1703; R. 2470.) 
Alternatively, Kraatz simply misunderstands the trial 
court's ruling. In his summary of argument he states "initially, 
contrary to well-settled law, the court made the startling ruling 
that [the dealership] had no burden to establish that Kraatz's 
discharge was justified under the terms of the Agreement." 
Kraatz Brief at 12. What the trial court said, however, is as 
follows: 
Plaintiff has the burden of establishing (1) he had a 
contract of employment with Heritage; (2) he performed 
his part of the Agreement; and (3) he has been damaged. 
Russell v. Qgden Union R.R. & Depot Co.. 247 P.2d 257, 
260-61 (Utah 1952). 2. Plaintiff has established he 
had a contract of employment with Heritage. The Agree-
ment is the written agreement entered into evidence as 
Exhibit 38. A party must tender his own agreed to per-
formance for the other party to be in default. Kelly 
v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 
1993). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate he per-
formed his part of the Agreement, (see infra). As a 
result, there is no burden upon Defendants to prove 
that the discharge of Plaintiff was justified. Id. at 
260-61. 
(R. 1703, CL Nos. 1, 2 (emphasis added).) Thus, the trial court 
did not impermissibly retain the burden on Kraatz as he argues. 
Contrary to Kraatz's claim, the court expressly found Kraatz had 
not established a prima facie case. Kraatz Brief at 14. More-
over, while the elements of proving a prima facie case are a 
13
 In addition, Utah law is clear that for an implied-in-
fact contract to exist as were those referred to in the cases 
cited by Kraatz, it must meet the requirements for offer of 
unilateral contract. See Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 
997, 1001-02 (Utah 1991). This simply does not fit with either 
the offer of evidence or argument by Kraatz at trial. 
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question of law, these are obviously not challenged by Kraatz, 
for the trial court relied on the very cases Kraatz cites. See 
Kraatz Brief at 15, citing Chiodo v. General Warehouse Corp.. 17 
Utah 2d 425, 413 P.2d 891, 893 n.3 (1966), and Russell v. Oaden 
Union Ry. & Depot Co., 122 Utah 197, 247 P.2d 257, 260 (1952). 
The only difference is that in both Chiodo and in Russell, the 
trial court found, as a matter of fact, that the employee had 
established a prima facie case, findings which the appellate 
court in each case affirmed. 
The real issue raised as to each of the six issues of Kraatz 
is whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 
Agreement. This is a question of mixed law and fact. However, 
when the legal issues on review "strike at the trial court's 
determination of whether there was a material breach of contract, 
and if so, when, and by whom" the standard of review is not de 
novo or "no deference" but that of "clearly erroneous." Saunders 
v. Sharp, 793 P.2d at 931. 
For example, Kraatz argues the interpretation of the terms 
"herein," "include," and "refusal" in section 2.1 of the Agree-
ment is a question of law. Kraatz Brief at 2, 20 n.2. This is 
incorrect. The trial court's interpretation of "refusal" is a 
question of law and fact, as the court clearly relied on extrin-
sic evidence in its interpretation.14 
As to Kraatz's fourth issue, whether the Handbook was part 
of the contract, Kraatz is really claiming the trial court erred 
14
 As did Kraatz. See, e.g., Kraatz Brief at 20. 
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in its finding the contract was integrated. Kraatz Brief at 3. 
This is a question of fact. See Hall v. Process Instruments and 
Control, Inc.. 866 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), afffd 890 
P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 1995). 
Kraatz's fifth issue, which claims the trial court erred in 
failing to hold Heritage liable for wrongful termination for not 
following the progressive discipline policy set forth in the 
Handbook, is also a factual issue. Before the trial court could 
determine whether Kraatz had breached the Agreement, it first had 
to determine whether the parties intended the Handbook to be part 
of the Agreement. This is a question of fact. See Johnson v. 
Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d at 1001. 
Issue No. 6, whether the trial court erred in finding Kraatz 
was not entitled to health benefits and stock appreciation, is 
also a question of fact because the evidence demonstrates Kraatz 
waived the right to health benefits and that he breached the 
contract by failing to substantially perform. 
Kraatz's only real issue is whether the court correctly 
interpreted the Agreement. As noted above, the standard of 
review as to this issue is whether the trial court's findings are 
clearly erroneous. As demonstrated in Points I and III herein, 
Kraatz fails to demonstrate that any of the trial court's signif-
icant rulings are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the trial 
court's ruling should stand. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS 
ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
In its oral ruling the trial court stated: 
This Court is of the view that plaintiff's termination 
was for cause contemplated by clauses B and C of para-
graph 2.1 of Exhibit 38. The evidence fails to support 
plaintiff's claims and this Court finds no cause of 
action on his Complaint. 
(R. 2470.) Kraatz argues this conclusion is incorrect. As 
demonstrated above, because Kraatz has failed to marshal all the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, this Court need 
not consider whether the findings on which this conclusion is 
based may stand. Assuming arguendo. however, this Court does not 
affirm on Kraatz's failure to marshal, the trial court's decision 
should still be affirmed. 
In order to challenge the trial court's ruling, Kraatz must 
demonstrate the findings on which the court's ruling is based are 
clearly erroneous. For a finding to be "clearly erroneous," it 
must be without adequate evidentiary support. See State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. In making its determination, it is not 
up to the appellate court to reweigh the evidence. See 
Butterfield v. Cook. 817 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
That Kraatz ignores this, and wants this Court to retry the case 
using his version of disputed facts, is clear from the following 
pleas (among others) in his brief: 
The Court should vacate the trial court's erroneous 
findings and substitute its own findings.... 
Kraatz Brief at 14. 
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Kraatz requests that the erroneous findings be stricken 
and that the Court substitute its own finding•... 
Kraatz Brief at 14, 30. 
As has been demonstrated in Point I, supra, there is ade-
quate evidence to support the specific findings challenged by 
Kraatz. It is also important to note, however, that the trial 
court's findings number over 100. Kraatz challenges very few of 
these. There is more than adequate support for the trial court's 
ruling from these findings (let alone from elsewhere in the 
record); its ruling that Kraatz's termination was justified 
should be affirmed. 
A. There is Adequate Evidence to Support the Court's 
Ruling. 
The following are examples of undisputed facts supporting 
the trial court's ruling which Kraatz does not challenge.15 
1. The purpose of the Agreement was to return Heritage to 
profitability, and for Kraatz to manage the dealership so B. 
Wilkinson could semi-retire, and to train B. Wilkinson's children 
in management duties so they could ultimately assume control. 
2. As a general manager Kraatz was required to produce 
income for Heritage, protect its assets, manage its employees, 
make advertising decisions, deal with the banks, and manage cash 
flow. (R. 1851-52; R. 2222; R. 2314.) 
These facts establish the duties of Kraatz under the 
Agreement. The facts below provide adequate support for the 
15
 These are examples only and there are undoubtedly others 
which would be more obvious had Kraatz marshaled the evidence. 
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trial court's ruling that Kraatz did not substantially perform 
these duties and that his termination of employment was justi-
fied. 
1. Kraatz did not protect Heritage's assets. Dan Hartmann, 
Vice President of Comerica, testified he was told by both Kraatz 
and B. Wilkinson that Kraatz was in control. Furthermore, Kraatz 
was the only one Hartmann could contact during the time the 
decision was made to move the flooring. The decision cost 
Heritage approximately $114,000 in penalties and interest. 
(R. 2052-53, 2059.) 
2. Kraatz failed to make a profit. Kraatz admits he was 
responsible for producing income, but argues the lack of profit-
ability was not his fault because the dealership was undercapi-
talized. The court found otherwise. It specifically stated that 
it found testimony of Larry H. Miller on this point persuasive. 
(R. 2469.) Miller testified the dealership was not undercapital-
ized and that Kraatz should have made a profit in 1992 had he 
managed cash flow properly. Miller also testified his own Toyota 
dealership, of a similar size, location, and import, had less 
capital, yet made a profit in 1990, 1991, and 1992. 
Kraatz does not challenge the testimony of his own expert 
which also supports the court's ruling that Kraatz failed his 
duty to make a profit, when a profit should have been realized. 
Schmitz testified a Honda dealership has such potential to be 
lucrative that it is a "license to steal" and a better investment 
than a mutual fund. (R. 2339.) These facts are adequate support 
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for the trial court's ruling that Kraatz's failure to make a 
profit justified his termination. 
The several facts in support of the trial court's findings 
as to training are set forth in the statement of facts and in 
Point I, herein. Facts that are not challenged that support the 
court's finding of Kraatz's breach as to this duty include the 
following: J. Wilkinson testified he was not trained in major 
areas of managing a dealership—parts, service, accounting, and 
human resources. Kraatz argues this is insufficient because, 
even though he did not train in these areas in the first twenty-
seven months, he might have under the remaining months of the 
Agreement. Kraatz's scenario is highly unlikely given the 
unchallenged findings that he created severe resistance by the 
children to him as manager, including demoting J. Wilkinson twice 
and threatening to fire him, even though J. Wilkinson was part 
owner and an officer and director of Heritage. (R. 2469.) 
That Kraatz breached his duties under the Agreement of 
returning the company to profitability and training the children 
is supported by adequate evidence. The trial court's ruling 
should thus be affirmed. 
B. The Trial Court's Finding that the Employee Handbook 
Was Not a Part of the Agreement is Not Clearly 
Erroneous. 
Kraatz mistakenly characterizes as a legal question the 
issue of whether the Handbook was part of the Agreement. Even 
the cases he cites in support of his argument, however, demon-
strate he is in error: whether a provision of a manual was 
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intended to be a contract provision is a question of fact. See. 
e.g., Brehanv v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 1991) ("If the 
terms of the manual do purport to limit [the employer's] power to 
discharge, the question of whether they become implied terms of 
the contract of employment is primarily a factual issue"); 
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483, 485 
(Utah 1989) ("The first question is whether the statements in the 
policy manual are sufficient to raise a factual question as to 
whether the presumption of at will employment has been rebut-
ted.") . 
Facts that support the trial court's ruling are as follows: 
1. Kraatz admits he never saw an Employee Handbook before 
signing the Agreement, and that the Agreement does not refer to 
any Handbook (R. 1843-44); 
2. Kraatz admits he has no acknowledgement of ever receiv-
ing one, and admits he was the person who made the decision and 
issued the order for all employees to turn in their Handbooks (R. 
1844-47); and 
3. The Handbook states: 
The contents of this Handbook are presented as a matter 
of information only. [T]hey are not conditions of 
employment....In particular, nothing in this handbook 
limits the Dealership's right to terminate the employ-
ment of any person at any time, with or without cause. 
(Exhibit 135.) 
These facts are adequate support for the trial court's find-
ing that the Agreement was integrated and thus did not include 
the Handbook. Moreover, the language of the Handbook specifical-
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ly states that it is not a contract. As stated in Berube, on 
which Kraatz relies, "An implied-in-fact promise cannot, of 
course, contradict a written contract term." 771 P.2d at 1044. 
The employment cases cited by Kraatz are not really on 
point, as in almost every case the appeal was from a summary 
judgment or a determination as a matter of law. See Brehany v. 
Nordstrom. Inc. 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991); Caldwell v. Ford Bacon & 
Davis, Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989); Berube v. Fashion 
Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). Here, the issue is not 
whether there are reasonable facts from which an implied contract 
could be found; here, after a four-day bench trial, the trial 
court found that the Handbook was not part of the Agreement. The 
trial court's ruling that the Handbook was not part of the 
Agreement should thus be affirmed.16 
C. The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Agreement is 
Not Clearly Erroneous. 
Kraatz also claims the trial court erred in ruling Kraatz 
was terminated for cause by incorrectly interpreting the words 
"herein," "refusal" and "include" in section 2.1 of the Agree-
ment. Section 2.1 states in relevant part: 
16
 Furthermore, inclusion of the Handbook would not give 
Kraatz the right to progressive discipline, for it specifically 
gives Heritage the right to "carry out any disciplinary action, 
depending upon its judgment of the circumstances involved." 
Section 310. This, of course, includes termination. In addi-
tion, the Handbook fails to support Kraatz's overall claim that 
he was not terminated for cause. Under the Handbook, the dealer-
ship "may carry out any disciplinary action depending upon its 
judgment of the circumstances involved." (FF Nos. F.8.b and 9.b 
at R. 1697.) 
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Employee's employment may not be terminated except for 
cause as defined herein. For purposes of this para-
graph, cause shall be deemed to include the following: 
A. Fraud; 
B. Dishonesty; 
C. Refusal by Employee to fulfill his em-
ployment responsibilities described in Arti-
cle I of this Agreement; or 
D. Employee becomes disabled to the extent 
he is unable to perform his duties hereunder 
as specified in Article I of this Agreement 
and such disability continues for a period of 
time longer than six (6) consecutive months. 
(Emphasis added) (See Exhibit 38 (Addendum A); R. 1706, CL No. 
B.7); Kraatz Brief pp. 16-24. As discussed above, Kraatz's ini-
tial error was to set forth the wrong standard of review. The 
interpretation of the parties' intentions under the Agreement 
required resorting to extrinsic evidence. The evidence relied on 
by the court is consistent with its interpretation of "refusal." 
Kraatz spends a large portion of his brief arguing that all 
he needed to do under the Agreement was to use his "best profes-
sional skill." This, according to Kraatz, was nothing more than 
"trying." According to Kraatz, he had to be specifically asked 
to perform a duty, and Kraatz in turn had to specifically and 
verbally tell Heritage he would not do the duty before he could 
be terminated. 
This argument is not borne out by the facts. And even if 
Kraatz can find facts to support his argument, it is immaterial, 
for there is adequate evidence to support the trial court's 
findings and conclusions that Kraatz's version was not the intent 
of the parties. 
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The court specifically and unequivocally rejected Kraatz's 
interpretation of the Agreement: 
Plaintiff's assertion he had a "no-cut" contract is not 
supported by the evidence. The Agreement lists reasons 
his employment can be terminated. Even if that was 
Plaintiff's initial intent, a comparison of the Draft 
Agreement (Exhibit 589) which the Agreement demon-
strates that subparagraph 2.1(c) expands the reasons 
for termination under the Agreement. Other than Plain-
tiff's testimony, there is no extrinsic evidence of a 
"no-cut" contract. On the contrary, this assertion was 
specifically denied by B. Wilkinson, and by Pat 
Nichols, an employee present at the meeting where 
Plaintiff maintains the representation was made. 
(R. 1710, CL B.10; R. 1687, FF Nos. B.ll, 12.)17 
Moreover, there is adequate support for the trial court's 
interpretation of "refusal" and "herein" to affirm the trial 
court's ruling. 
Kraatz does not dispute the whole purpose of the Agreement 
was to return Heritage to profitability, to train B. Wilkinson's 
children to take over the dealership, to manage the dealership to 
allow B. Wilkinson to semi-retire. He does not dispute that 
under the Agreement he was required to manage cash flow, train 
the owner's children, produce income for Heritage, maintain its 
assets, conduct advertising, make financial forecasting deci-
sions, and develop and maintain the dealership. (R. 1851-52.) 
Kraatz's own testimony and the unambiguous language of the 
Agreement that he "shall perform" these duties make it clear that 
17
 The court also found extrinsic evidence necessary to 
interpret the parties' intent as to the Agreement. See also R. 
1705, CL No. 5 ("The Agreement remains ambiguous as to the skills 
and experience Plaintiff was to provide as general manager to the 
Dealership to develop and maintain the Dealership"); (R. 1705, CL 
No. 6, citing R. 1688-90, FF Nos. D.l-13). 
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these were requirements of Kraatz under the Agreement, and were 
not simply options he could exercise if his fancy struck him.18 
In other words, Kraatz argues he could stand by and fiddle while 
Heritage went bankrupt, 
Kraatz admits he has duties under the parties1 Agreement. 
Section 1.2. of the Agreement places an affirmative duty on 
Kraatz ("shall contribute his best professional skill" and "shall 
maintain and develop" the dealership, and "shall perform" servic-
es for Heritage). The Agreement, through the use of "shall," 
unambiguously requires Kraatz to perform these services he agreed 
to do. Thus, the only rational interpretation of "refusal" which 
gives meaning to the Agreement and is consistent with the trial 
court•s findings must encompass Kraatz•s failure to act when 
action was required. (R. 1708-09, CL Nos. 8.B.3(a) and (b).)19 
Given this, Kraatz's argument that he could not be terminat-
ed unless he manifested a "positive and unequivocal" intent not 
to comply makes no sense; Kraatz's best professional skill must 
be, at a minimum, affirmatively performing what he represented he 
would bring to the dealership. This included training 
18
 Thus, his testimony does not support his argument that he 
could not be fired unless he manifested 
(1) "a positive and unequivocal intent not to render 
his promised performance," Kraatz Brief at 22, 23; or 
(2) "a wilful or intentional dereliction of duty...," 
Kraatz Brief at 24; or (3) a mental determination not 
to comply, Kraatz Brief at 22; or (4) a culpable omis-
sion, Kraatz Brief at 23; or (5) a "wilful failure." 
19
 Refusal is not only rejecting a request to do a specific 
act, but is also the failure to act when action is required. 
Reliford v. Eastern Oil Corp., 260 F.2d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 1958). 
(See also R. 1708, CL No. 8.A.3(a), n.2.) 
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J. Wilkinson, maintaining and developing Heritage, and managing 
cash flow. The trial court found he failed to substantially 
perform the duties the parties intended he perform. This inter-
pretation is consistent with well-settled rules of contract 
construction and with the uncontroverted evidence.20 
Nor is the trial court's interpretation of "herein" incor-
rect. Kraatz urges the court to construe "herein" as referring 
to section 2.1 only. But this interpretation is inconsistent 
with the plain language of section 2.1 which refers to "refusal 
or inability to perform his duties set forth in Article I of this 
Agreement" (emphasis added). Kraatz's attempt to define "here-
in" is thus self-defeating: Section 2.1 incorporates Article D, 
and it is thus impossible to read it without referring to the 
document as a whole.21 In addition, the extrinsic evidence, 
including Kraatzfs own testimony, controverts his interpretation. 
He admits that the management and the "skills" he was required to 
provide under Article I of the Agreement to "maintain and devel-
op" Heritage included the duty to produce income, to manage 
advertising, to protect the assets of Heritage and to manage cash 
20
 Kraatz's refusal to accept this interpretation requires 
him to ignore uncontroverted facts in support of the trial 
court's specific ruling. The court specifically found Kraatz's 
claim of a no-cut contract was controverted by the testimony of 
Pat Nichols, an employee present at the meeting where Kraatz 
maintains the representation was made. (R. 1710, CL No. B.10.) 
21
 "It is a basic rule of contract interpretation that the 
intent of the parties is to be determined from the writing 
itself, with each provision being considered in relation to all 
others." Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 
889 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995). 
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flow. (R. 1851-52.) Obviously his failure to do what he was re-
quired to do in Article I of the Agreement has to be included 
within the meaning of "herein." 
Kraatz also alleges the court erred in its interpretation of 
"include." At trial, Kraatz urged the court to interpret "in-
clude" as limiting the reasons he could be terminated to those 
set forth in 2.1 A-D, whereas Heritage urged the more expansive 
interpretation of "include, but not limited to," in which A-D 
were examples of termination for cause. As the court specifical-
ly ruled Kraatz1s termination was "for cause contemplated by 
clauses B and C of paragraph 2.1 of Exhibit 38," an interpreta-
tion of the word "include" is not relevant. Again, however, 
given that paragraph 2.1 specifically refers to Article I, and 
given the uncontroverted evidence by Kraatz and others that his 
duties as general manager included duties not specifically set 
forth in the Agreement, there is adequate evidence to support the 
trial court's finding that "include" was to be used expansively, 
and was not meant to be read as "is limited to" as Kraatz rear-
gues. 
Thus the court's interpretation is not clearly erroneous, 
and its ruling dismissing Kraatz's claim should be affirmed. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ERRONEOUSLY 
IGNORING THE PLAIN MANDATE OF RULE 15(a) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
On March 22, 1993, Heritage, while represented by previous 
counsel, filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. In their 
Answer, Heritage asserted their entitlement to recover reasonable 
attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. On 
April 9, 1996, nearly two months before the scheduled discovery 
cutoff, Heritage sought to amend their Answer to assert a coun-
terclaim to recover attorney's fees pursuant to the express 
provisions of the Employment Agreement between Defendant Heritage 
Honda and Plaintiff William Anthony Kraatz. On May 6, 1996, 
Heritage filed an Amended Motion for Leave to Amend their Answer 
and Assert a Counterclaim for attorney's fees. A trial date had 
not been set at the time of Heritage's Motion for Leave to Amend 
their Answer, nor prior to Heritage's amended motion. Clearly no 
further discovery was necessary, other than the production of the 
billing statements by Winder and Haslam, counsel for Heritage, to 
counsel for Kraatz.22 However, in order to ensure Kraatz would 
not be prejudiced, Heritage made an offer to Kraatz to fully 
cooperate in discovery and to make available any witness Kraatz 
felt was needed. 
In spite of this offer, Kraatz did not respond, and did not 
seek any further discovery. Over two months later, on July 30, 
22
 Indeed, as Kraatz had already taken 27 volumes of deposi-
tions, it is difficult to imagine what further discovery he could 
envision as even being possible. 
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1996, the trial court denied Heritage's Motion for Leave to Amend 
Answer in a minute entry. See Addendum "F."23 The trial 
court's ruling was based on its erroneous perception that the 
amendment would create a need for additional discovery and result 
in delaying the trial when, in fact, the trial date had already 
been continued. Finally, on August 29, 1996, two days after the 
trial began, the court entered its formal Order Denying 
Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and to Assert Coun-
terclaim and Amended Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and to 
Assert Counterclaim, because Judge Frederick was not persuaded he 
should change his earlier ruling. (R. 2386-87.) 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires." Kraatz's Complaint sought attorney's fees, and he was 
aware from the commencement of this lawsuit that the non-default-
ing party would be entitled to recover attorney's fees. The 
Employment Agreement provides, at Paragraph 5.6: 
In addition to any other rights contained herein, in 
the event either party defaults in the performance of 
any term or condition hereunder, the defaulting party 
shall pay all expenses and costs incurred by the other 
party in enforcing the terms hereof, including but not 
limited to, costs, reasonable attorney's fees, expert 
witness fees, and/or deposition costs whether incurred 
through legal action or otherwise and whether incurred 
before or after judgment. [Emphasis supplied.] 
Kraatz simply would not have been prejudiced had the trial court 
allowed Heritage to amend its Answer to assert a counterclaim for 
23
 Copies of all relevant pleadings relating to Heritage's 
Motion to Amend are attached as Addendum "F." 
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attorney's fees under the Agreement. Heritage's request created 
no burden for Kraatz: he knew Heritage had a right to attorney's 
fees, and he had already conducted discovery regarding the issue 
of his default under the Employment Agreement. As pointed out to 
the trial court, the only further discovery which would have been 
required was the review of billing statements. The trial court 
was informed of this at trial and was asked to reconsider. 
Without stating further reasons, the court denied the motion for 
reconsideration. 
The trial court's denial was an abuse of discretion. Kraatz 
would not have been prejudiced. Its error is material for 
Heritage, because Heritage should be allowed its fees under the 
Agreement. Kraatz raised an objection, stating further unspeci-
fied discovery may be necessary. This objection was without 
merit. As pointed out to the trial court, the only further 
discovery which would have been reasonably required was the 
production of the billing statements of Winder and Haslam, 
counsel for Heritage, for Kraatz to review. In the spirit of 
accommodation, however, Heritage agreed to make available and 
cooperate fully with any further discovery Kraatz believed he 
needed. The trial court apparently misunderstood this offer, and 
took it as an admission by Heritage that further discovery was 
necessary. As was clear through the evidence presented in 
pleadings and at trial, however, no further discovery was neces-
sary, and the court should have granted the motion to reconsider 
in order to conform with the evidence. (R. 2386-87.) 
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Provision 5.6 providing for attorney's fees is unambiguous. 
When an unambiguous contractual term provides for an award of 
attorney's fees, the fees "are to be *awarded as a matter of 
legal right.'" Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d at 931 (citations 
omitted). In this case, had Heritage been allowed to amend its 
Answer, it would have been entitled to an award of "costs, 
reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and deposition 
costs pursuant to the Agreement." 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court, at the conclusion of a four-day trial, made 
extensive and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Kraatz has failed to marshal the evidence or to demonstrate any 
legal or factual error on the part of the trial court. Its 
ruling as to no cause of action and dismissal of Kraatz's Com-
plaint should be affirmed. However, as to the issue of attor-
ney's fees, the trial court's denial of Heritage's Motion to 
Amend its Complaint should be reversed by reason of an abuse of 
discretion. The matter should be remanded to the trial court for 
a determination of the amount of reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs to be awarded to Heritage pursuant to the parties' Agree-
ment. 
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